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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: PART 32

Index No. 104097/12

In the Matter of L. DENNIS KOZLOWSKI,
Petitioner,

:

For a Judgment Pursuant to CPLR Article 78,
- against -

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ 1 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - ~ - - - - - - - - - -

:
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CAROL E. HUFF, J.:

In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner, an incarcerated person, seeks to annul the
Determination of respondent New York State Board of Parole dated April 4,2012, which denied
his application for parole. Petitioner contends that the Board issued a conclusory determination
that was inadequate 011 its face, that it failed to comply with requisite procedures and that it relied
on erroneous information.
Petitioner was convicted of thirteen counts of first-degree Grand Larceny, one count each

of fourth-degree Conspiracy and Violation of General Business Law

4 352-c(5), and eight counts

of first-dcgrce Falsifying a Business Record. He was given an indeterminate sentence of eight
and one-third to twenty-five years.

Petitioner sought merit time release pursuant to 7 NYCRR

8 280.

Having met certain

criteria set forth in the statute, an inmate is entitled to seek parole before his minimum sentence
has elapsed. In such a case the Board of Parole must use the same criteria as in a normal parole
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release determination. See Executive Law 5 259-i(2)(c)(A), which provides:
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good
conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if
there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime
as to undermine respect for law.
The Parole Board is required to consider factors including the inmate’s institutional
record, his performance in a temporary release program, his plans for after release, statements
made by victims of the inmate’s crimes, any prior criminal record and:
the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence,
length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court, the district
attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as
consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following
arrest prior to confinement. . . .

“[SJo long as the Board’s discretion is exercised in accordance with the statutory
requirements, its discretion in matters of parole release is not judicially reviewable,” People ex
rel. Herbert v New York State Board of Parole, 97 AD2d 128, 131 (1”Dept 1983). “The Board
is not required to articulate every statutory factor considered in making its decision or to give

each such factor equal weight.” Nicoletta v New York State Div. of Parole, 74 AD3d 1609 (3d
Dept 2010). However, “where the record convincingly demonstrates that the board did in fact
fail to consider the proper standards, the courts must intervene.” King v New York State Div. of
Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 43 1 (1 Dept 1993). In all cases, when denyng a parole application the

Board is required to state in writing “the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such

reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms.” Executive Law 5 259-i(2)(a).
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The April 4, 20 12, Determination of the Board of Parole, in its entirety, is as follows:
Following careful review and deliberation of your record and interview,
this panel concludes that discretionary release is not presently warranted due to
concern for the public safety and welfare. The following factors were properly
weighed and considered. Your instant offenses are the result of your theft of over
one-hundred million dollars from Tyco, an international public corporation, in
glaring violation of the trust placed in you as CEO by the board of directors and
corporate shareholders. The former chief financial officer of Tyco was your codefendants [sic]. The instant offenses are your only offenses of record. Your
institutional programming indicates progress and achievement which is noted to
your credit. Your disciplinary record appears clean and is likewise noted. Your
receipt of a merit certificate is acknowledged and considered by the panel.
Required statutory factors have been considered, including your risk to the
community, rehabilitation efforts, and your needs for successful community reentry.
Your discretionary release, at this time, would thus not be compatible with
the welfare of society at large, and would tend to deprecate the seriousness of the
instant offense(s), and undermine respect for the law.
The Determination is almost entirely conclusory, and requires the Court to rely on
speculation to attempt to understaiid how it was decided that the granting of parole would
deprecate the seriousness of the offense and undermine respect for law, or affect “public safety
and welfare.”
It appears that the Board of Parole relied exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner’s
crime in reaching its Determination. In King. supra, at 432, the First Department found that the a
Board’s deteimiination denying parole cannot be based solely on the seriousness of the crime:

[Tlhe only statutory criterion [stated in] the Board’s determination to deny the
application was its finding that petitioner’s release would so deprecate the
seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law by reason of the fact that
the victim of the crime was a police officer. The legislature, however, has not
defined “seriousness of [the] crime” in terms of specific categories of either
crimes or victims and it is apparent that in order to preclude the granting of parole
oxclusively 011 this ground there iiiust have been some significantly aggravating or
egregious circumstances surrounding the commission of the particular crime.
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-See also Wallinan v Travis, 18 AD3d 304, 307 (1” Dept 2005) (,‘A Parole Board’s
exclusive reliance on the severity of the offense to deny parole not only contravenes the
discretionary scheme mandated by statute, but also effectively constitutes an unauthorized
resentencing of the defendant”).
Respondent argues that, in light of the nature of the crime, “no reasonable person can
conclude that aggravating factors are not present in the instant matter. . . .” (Answer, at l[35), but
this statement is not supported by case law. The cases respondent cites all concern violent
offenses. It may be that factors present in petitioner’s crimes do exist to support the Board’s
finding, but those factors have not been identified. Nor have any “factors and reasons” been
given “in detail” as to why petitioner’s release would undermine public safety and welfare.

Because in its Determination the Board of Parole has not sufficiently detailed its reasons

for denying petitioner parole, the petition is granted to the extent that the Determination is
annulled and the matter is remanded to the Board for a de novo hearing and a determination
consistent wi tli the requirements of Executive Law 4 259-i(2)(a).
Accordingly, it is

ADJUDGED that the petition is granted to the extent that the Determination is annulled
and the matter is remanded to the Board for a de novo hearing and a determination consistent
with the requirements of Executive Law

5 259-i(2)(a); and it is further

ADJUDGED that the petition is otherwise denied.

Dated:

FEB 0 5 2913
J.S.C.
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